Digital Artifacts: Forensic Evidence of an International Identity Theft Scheme Targeting a Homeless Individual

 

International Identity Theft Scheme Targeting a Homeless Individual

I. Introduction – The Legal and Human Context

This report presents a factual and technical summary of a cross-jurisdictional identity theft incident involving the unauthorized use of a homeless individual’s personal identity in the creation of a fraudulent e-commerce website. The acts described herein potentially constitute violations of international cybercrime statutes, U.S. identity theft laws, and data protection frameworks, including (but not limited to) fraud, forgery, and digital impersonation offenses under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030) and various international anti-cybercrime treaties such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.

The core of this case lies not merely in technical misconduct, but in the exploitation of a vulnerable human being, a person without stable housing, resources, or legal defense capacity. The deliberate misuse of a homeless individual’s name, contact address (a Cleveland, Ohio shelter), and likeness for an international e-commerce front demonstrates not only digital malice but moral bankruptcy.

II. Factual Background
The site’s digital DNA nameservers, registrant data, timestamps, and mirrored content ties it directly to a second site, SeawispJewels.com, and to the registered company SEAWISPJEWELS LTD (UK Company No. 16646185)

• Victim: Mr. Nathan Alexander Allen, a homeless resident in Cleveland, Ohio.

• Nature of Harm: Unlawful identity use and domain registration in the victim’s name to establish a fraudulent online retail storefront.

• Perpetrator(s): Unknown, but technical forensics indicate operations linking to Vietnam, France, and the United Kingdom, utilizing U.S. contact points to simulate legitimacy.

The fraudulent entity constructed a website titled NathanAlexanderAllenStore.com, registered through Cloudflare, Inc., and hosted on a server physically located in France (IP 161.97.78.90).

Image File: Correlation between the two websites, identical file names and August 2025 timestamps indicate shared control or content duplication. Click on blue link to see Forensic Evidence of Digital Artifacts

/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/seawispjewels.com_-1.png

III. Summary of Digital Artifacts (Forensic Evidence) 

IV. Jurisdictional Analysis

The impersonation of a U.S. citizen (Mr. Allen) invokes federal and state protections against identity theft. The fraudulent website’s use of a Cleveland homeless shelter address constitutes false representation for commercial gain, a form of consumer deception and criminal impersonation.

The incorporation of SEAWISPJEWELS LTD in London’s Covent Garden (via a virtual office) brings UK company law jurisdiction into play. The registration of a company with an offshore principal in Vietnam raises potential Companies Act 2006 compliance issues and cross-border fraud risk under the UK Serious Fraud Office’s oversight.

The director’s Vietnamese address and matching WHOIS data establish operational links to Southeast Asia. The conduct may fall within the remit of international cooperation under the Budapest Convention for cybercrime.
The French IP address (161.97.78.90) signifies physical data storage within France, bringing EU data protection and hosting jurisdiction under French and European law.

1. United States (Primary Victim Jurisdiction)
   

2. United Kingdom (Corporate Registration)
   

3. Vietnam (Registrant’s Residence)
   

4. France (Hosting Server Location)
   

V. The Human Element: Exploitation of the Vulnerable
By hijacking the identity of a homeless American citizen, the perpetrators leveraged a population least likely to be believed or capable of defending themselves. Such exploitation transforms homelessness, a condition already fraught with social neglect into a shield for international fraud.

This case highlights a moral and humanitarian breach beyond its technical crime.

Mr. Allen, having no online business and no resources, now faces the burden of a domain in his name, associated with overseas actors and digital storefronts selling goods he never touched or consented to represent.

VI. Evidentiary Chain

The digital artifacts collectively form a chain of custody in cyber-forensic terms:

1. Shared registrar and nameservers = common administrative control

2. Shared hosting IP = identical technical environment

3. Shared image naming = content replication

4. Shared registrant address (Vietnam) + corporate filing (UK) = cross-border link

5. Use of U.S. shelter address = identity theft and misrepresentation

When considered together, these elements establish prima facie evidence of a coordinated fraud conducted across multiple international jurisdictions.

VII. Potential Legal Characterization

While only a competent court can determine culpability, the acts described could fall under:

• Identity Theft and Impersonation (U.S.) - wrongful use of another’s name and identifying information (18 U.S.C. § 1028).

• Wire Fraud (U.S.) - use of interstate or foreign communications to further fraudulent activity (18 U.S.C. § 1343).

• Computer Misuse and Data Fraud (UK) - violation of Computer Misuse Act 1990.

• Cybercrime and Forgery (International) - cross-border coordination implicating Budapest Convention standards.

VIII. Conclusion
Through a mixture of international hosting, corporate fronting, and DNS obfuscation, criminals constructed a commercial illusion while hiding behind the legal boundaries of multiple nations.

This case demonstrates how easily an individual’s name particularly that of someone homeless can be weaponized in the digital world.

The digital artifacts prove the trail:

• Vietnam registered the domains,

• France hosted them,

• the United Kingdom legitimized the entity, and

• the United States provided the identity of the unsuspecting victim.

At its heart, this is not simply a matter of computer misuse, it is the theft of human dignity through technology.

IX. Legal Commentary and Recommendations

1. Jurisdictional Responsibility
Such circumstances trigger shared investigative responsibility under:

This case presents a multi-jurisdictional cybercrime model, in which the victim resides in the United States, the registrant operates from Vietnam, the corporate entity is registered in the United Kingdom, and the data is hosted on a server in France.

• The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (2001) – facilitating cooperation between signatory nations.

• Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) between the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.

Each nation implicated has both territorial jurisdiction (based on where conduct occurred) and extraterritorial jurisdiction (based on the nationality of the victim and the transnational nature of the harm).

2. Duty to Investigate

Under general international cybercrime principles and U.S. domestic law, this pattern of conduct would require law enforcement referral and potential cross-border investigation involving:

• United States:
  Agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Cyber Division and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028 (identity theft), 1343 (wire fraud), and 1030 (computer fraud). Given that the fraudulent entity used a U.S. address and phone number, the case satisfies domestic jurisdictional requirements.
• United Kingdom:
  The Companies House registration of SEAWISPJEWELS LTD at a known virtual office location (71–75 Shelton Street, London WC2H 9JQ) indicates possible Companies Act 2006 violations if the corporate entity was created for fraudulent use or fails to maintain accurate beneficial ownership disclosures.
  This warrants notification to the UK National Crime Agency (NCA) and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO).
• France:
  The French hosting provider, responsible for maintaining the server (IP 161.97.78.90), holds legal obligations under EU GDPR and French data retention laws to preserve server logs and assist in criminal inquiries.
  Coordination through the French Gendarmerie’s Cybercrime Unit (C3N) may be appropriate.
• Vietnam:
  With the named director of SEAWISPJEWELS LTD (Mr. Tran Manh Khanh Vu) residing in Vietnam, the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security could receive mutual legal assistance requests. The country’s Law on Cyber Information Security (2015) includes provisions on identity misrepresentation and online fraud.

3. Registrar and Hosting Accountability

This incident meets the threshold for Registrar Abuse Reporting, as the fraudulent domain misrepresents identity, engages in deception, and uses falsified registrant information.

Cloudflare, Inc., as registrar and DNS intermediary, is bound by ICANN policies requiring the maintenance of accurate WHOIS data and the prompt suspension of domains upon credible evidence of abuse.

Likewise, the French hosting provider may bear secondary liability if, after being notified, it continues to host demonstrably fraudulent content. Under EU law (Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive), service providers lose immunity once they “have actual knowledge of illegal activity” and fail to act expeditiously.

4. Evidentiary Considerations

To maintain the chain of evidence and preserve admissibility:

• All domain WHOIS data, DNS lookups, IP resolutions, and image file metadata should be archived.

• Screenshots and timestamped server headers (HTTP responses) should be captured and notarized where possible.

• The identical image file names and creation timestamps constitute digital fingerprints demonstrating control by the same operator.

Courts have historically accepted this class of technical evidence as “circumstantial proof of control and authorship,” particularly when accompanied by IP address consistency and matching registrar accounts.

5. Civil and Criminal Remedies

While prosecution may depend on cross-border cooperation, potential avenues for redress include:

• Criminal complaint by U.S. authorities for identity theft, fraud, and unauthorized digital impersonation.

• Civil actions (if the victim is later represented) for defamation, misappropriation of likeness, and negligent infliction of reputational harm.

• Registrar and hosting termination to prevent continued damage and disable the fraudulent website.

• International asset tracing if payment processors or e-commerce accounts were linked to the fraud.

The moral and legal imperative is clear: digital anonymity cannot be used to weaponize the identity of the destitute.

6. Policy and Ethical Implications

It reveals how easily international networks can obscure accountability behind corporate registrations, proxy servers, and offshore infrastructure.
Legislative bodies and internet governance organizations should consider:

This case underscores a critical gap in global cybersecurity ethics, the exploitation of homeless individuals as unwitting digital fronts.

• Requiring identity verification for domain registration that claims to represent individuals.

• Mandating registrar-level flagging when WHOIS data contains addresses known to belong to shelters or aid facilities.

• Strengthening cross-border takedown mechanisms for identity-based fraud.

7. Closing Statement

An entity registered in Vietnam, incorporated a company in the United Kingdom, hosted its data in France, and stole the identity of a homeless man in Ohio, United States to front a fraudulent online business.

This is more than a matter of data—it is a crime against human dignity, executed through code, convenience, and concealment.

The digital evidence tells a single, coherent story:

What began as a technical investigation into shared server logs became a humanitarian indictment of global cyber exploitation.